Author Topic: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section  (Read 155147 times)

Offline mack

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #120 on: February 25, 2018, 04:20:35 PM »
Stapleton - pre-FDNY fire history - "How A 19th Century Mob Of Arsonists Burned Down Staten Island’s Quarantine Hospital"
 
       - phillipe martin chatelain 12/03/2013   Architecture, New York

     On the night of Sept. 1 1858, a mob of villagers stormed the grounds of the quarantine station on Staten Island and set fire to almost all of the buildings in the hospital complex.

     In 1858, before Staten Island consolidated with the rest of New York City, the New York Marine Hospital housed around 1,500 persons suffering from infectious diseases. The practice of medicine was in a less sophisticated state and in the 19th century this was the City’s best defense against new diseases, such as smallpox, cholera, typhus and yellow fever. While quarantine is a practice that strictly limits the civil and human rights of an otherwise “free” person, the architecture of the City’s many islands reflect this once mainstream practice. On September 1, 1858 the site was burned down in a mob protest that stemmed from community outrage about the hazards of housing a quarantine hospital of this scale in what was essentially their backyards.



     Opened in 1799, the NY Marine Hospital which became known solely as the “Quarantine,” was located in the Tompkinsville section of Staten Island. This island in New York Harbor was pushing 20,000 residents in a landmass of roughly three times the size of Manhattan–which had 630,000 residents. It was a mass of farmland, with various communities located on the northeastern shore. The Quarantine was accessible primarily by steamboat, and was fortified by six-foot-tall brick walls on all sides.

     The New York Harbor at this time was a place of new beginnings, as the immigrant population was booming. Foreign-born settlers with their sights on New York City carried with them all their belongings and, perhaps unknowingly, new infectious diseases. According to the Public Health Chronicles, many of these new immigrants arrived sick with one of the diseases common to sea travelers in the 19th century. Vessels entering New York Harbor were vigorously inspected. All it took was a single passenger or crew member with an infectious disease for an arriving ship to be redirected from the docks of Brooklyn or Manhattan to the piers of the Quarantine.
 
     The Quarantine became somewhat of a prison to the sick, who were “laid in wagons by the boatmen” and brought to the appropriate hospitals, while the rest “although healthy, were kept in hospital quarters for observation.” It was a major enterprise, and the Quarantine expenses and salaries were paid for by the hefty taxes imposed on the vessels that used the port–“$2 for each cabin passenger and $0.50 for each traveler in steerage”– today worth about $61 and $15 respectively.

     After an 1848 yellow fever outbreak in the neighboring Staten Island communities, opposition to the Quarantine kept building grew.  The perception among Staten Islanders at the time was that if not for the Quarantine, there would be virtually no disease on the Island at all. Staten Islanders were convinced that illness came to their towns in two ways. One theory was that diseases were blown by the wind from infected vessels anchored offshore… Locals were also convinced that infectious diseases were carried into the community by Quarantine staff [who] reside in the village.

     On September 1, 1858, thirty men approached and ransacked the establishment, which had relatively low occupancy for the night (some assume that administrators were aware of the impending attack). The hospital staff, at first scrambling to release the animals and rescue patients, were confused to find that they had all been moved. As the mob made its way around the Quarantine grounds, setting new fires, it had swelled to several hundred people. The mob resolved to return the next day to “celebrate” the burning of the Quarantine Hospital, which resulted in the burning of any remaining buildings.

     

     Astoundingly, only two people died in the whole ordeal. One man was killed by a Quarantine worker who took the opportunity to settle an old score. Another died of yellow fever.
The organizers, Ray Tompkins and John C. Thompson, who were charged for the arson of the former Marine Hospital were acquitted of all charges by Judge Henry B. Metcalfe (himself a Staten Island man who argued for the removal of the Quarantine in 1849).

     https://untappedcities.com/2013/12/03/how-19th-century-mob-of-arsonists-burned-down-staten-islands-quarantine-hospital/


     Note - The Qurantine's services were transferred to a new facility built in Stapleton under the US Marine Hospital Service, which later became the US Public Health Service.  The hospital was sold to the Sisters of Charity and was run as a private hospital, Bayley Seton Hospital, 1980-2002.  It is now abandoned.

     

     https://abandonednyc.com/tag/bayley-seton-hospital/
« Last Edit: February 25, 2018, 04:45:05 PM by mack »

Nycfire.net

Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #120 on: February 25, 2018, 04:20:35 PM »

Offline mack

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #121 on: February 27, 2018, 07:45:45 PM »
Engine 2 Firehouse  530 W 43rd Street  Midtown West, Manhattan 3rd Division, 9th Battalion  DISBANDED

     Engine 2 organized  304 W 47th Street former quarters of volunteer "Hudson" Engine 1          1865
     Engine 2 moved to 530 W 43rd Street former quarters of volunteer "Washington" Hose 12      1870
     Engine 2 moved to 604-606 W 43rd Street                                                                          1894
     Engine 2 moved to new firehouse 530 W 43rd Street                                                            1895
     Engine 2 disbanded                                                                                                           1972

     Battalion 7 located 304 W 47th Street at Engine 2                                                          1874-1879


Pre-FDNY:

     - "Hudson" Engine 1 was established 1731 in a shed on Wall St vicinity of then City Hall - original apparatus brought from London - everyone in neighborhood was required to turn out for fires -company moved several times and built firehouse at 304 W 47th St which served as original quarters for FDNY Engine 2 (1865-1870), FDNY Chemical Engine 5 (1875-1877) and FDNY Battalion 7 (1874-1879)

         

         

     - LODDs - Engine 1 Assistant Foreman Francis Joseph died in line of duty at a fire in 1827, with Fireman David W. Raymer, Engine 40, on March 8, 1827.  Joseph and Raymer were operating on a ladder at a store fire on Maiden Lane.  In heavy smoke, a portion of the building cornice collapsed on the firefighters.  RIP.  Never forget.

         


Engine 2:

     

     

     

     

     


FDNY medals:

     THOMAS W. SMITH CAPT. ENG. 2 APR. 17, 1914 JAMES GORDON BENNETT MEDAL
 
         

         
     
     WILLIAM J. MAAS FF. ENG. 2 JUL. 1, 1926 PRENTICE MEDAL

     ANDREW M. DOYLE FF. ENG. 2 MAY 6, 1972 FDR MEDAL


Engine 2 LODDs:

     FIREFIGHTER WILLIAM KRATTINGER, FEBRUARY 16, 1882
     
          He died as a result of a severe skull fracture sustained while operating at an alarm on February 11th.

     LIEUTENANT JOHN DURKIN, November 24, 1937

         
         
          Lieutenant John Durkin died in Knickerbocker Hospital from the effects of inhaling carbon tetrachloride the day before. The fire at 10:15 in the morning was at 688 to 690 Eleventh Avenue. He did not become ill until reaching home that night and died in the hospital the following night.

     LIEUTENANT ARTHUR WAGNER, February 27, 1965

          Lieutenant Wagner suffered a fatal heart attack while returning to quarters from a 4-alarm fire.

     RIP.  Never forget.


530 W 43rd Street - Rescue 1 firehouse - 1973-1985 - destroyed January 23, 1985 during adjoining warehouse multiple alarm fire and collapse:

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     


Midtown:

     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midtown_Manhattan




« Last Edit: February 27, 2018, 07:56:42 PM by mack »

Offline mack

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #122 on: March 02, 2018, 12:50:39 AM »
FDNY bullet holes:

     Engine 42 - Bronx - 1980s:

         


     Engine 234 - Brooklyn - 1993:

         
« Last Edit: March 02, 2018, 01:11:34 AM by mack »

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #123 on: March 04, 2018, 01:33:28 AM »
Engine 82/Ladder 31  Firehouse 1215 Intervale Avenue  West Farms, South Bronx  6th Division, 26th Battalion  "La Casa Grande"

     Engine 82 organized 1215 Intervale Avenue                                          1905
     Engine 82 became Combined Engine 82                                                1905
     Combined Engine 82 became Engine 82                                                1907 
 
     Ladder 31 organized 1215 Intervale Avenue at Engine 82                       1907

     Engine 85 located at 1215 Intervale Avenue at Engine 92                       1967-1971

     Tactical Control Unit 712 located at 1215 Intervale Avenue at Engine 82  1969-1971

     Searchlight 3 located at 1215 Intervale Avenue at Engine 82                   1951-1967

     Hydrant 7 located at 1215 Intervale Avenue at Engine 82                        1951-1957

     Division 7 located at 1215 Intervale Avenue at Engine 82        1948-1949 and 1951-1956

     Battalion 3 located at 1215 Intervale Avenue at Engine 82                       1956-1968

     Battalion 27 located at 1215 Intervale Avenue at Engine 82                     1969-1978


1215 Intervale Avenue firehouse:

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     


Engine 82:

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     
   
     
   
     

     


Ladder 31:

     

     

     

     

     

     

     


Engine 85:

     


Tactical Control Unit 712:

     


Battalion 27:

     

     


Engine 82/Ladder 31:

     

     

     

     


BBC "Bronx is Burning":

     

     

     

     


Engine 82/Ladder 31 members:

     

     FF Dennis Smith, Engine 82, author, firefighter advocate:

         

          http://www.dennissmith.com/

     CAPT Bob Farrell, Ladder 31 1970s:

         
   
          http://firebytrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Bob-Farrell-Face-Book-Stories-.pdf

     FF Mickey Maye, Ladder 31, UFA President 1970s:

         

          http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/mickey-maye-83-champion-ring-article-1.1265891

     Assistant Chief Robert Manson - former captain Engine 82 1973-1976
 
         

     Fire Commissioner Carlos Rivera - former Lt Engine 82 1970s

         


Engine 82 FDNY medals:

     THOMAS J. WALSH LT. ENG. 82 MAR. 31, 1975 KENNY

         

     ROBERT RODRIGUIZ FF. ENG. 82 OFF DUTY JUN. 21, 1976 MC ELLIGOTT

         

     RICHARD A. DE SIMONE LT. ENG. 82 JUL. 9, 1978 UFOA

           

     ROBERT W. BEATLEY FF. ENG. 82 MAY 12, 1979 CRIMMINS

         


Ladder 31 FDNY medals:

     JOHN P. CANNY FF. LAD. 31 NOV. 3, 1949 KENNY

     EDWARD B. HOETZEL FF. LAD. 31 NOV. 22, 1957 FDR

     WILLIAM V. BOHNER FF. LAD. 31 NOV. 22, 1957 SCOTT

     EARL J. MALONEY FF. LAD. 31 MAR. 26, 1959 COMMERCE

     MICHAEL MAYE FF. LAD. 31 DEC. 7, 1965 FDR

         

     MICHAEL MAYE FF. LAD. 31 MAY 29, 1967 WILLIAMS

         

     VINCENT J. BOLLON FF. LAD. 31 FEB. 11, 1968 JOHNSTON

         

          http://www.ufanyc.org/cms/contents/view/10421

     DONALD H. BUTLER FF. LAD. 31 DEC. 8, 1968 HOLY NAME

         

     RICHARD J. RITTMEYER FF. LAD. 31 AUG. 9, 1969 HUGH BONNER

         

     RICHARD J. BITTLES FF. LAD. 31 MAY 30, 1969 COLUMBIA

         

     WILLIAM P. GRIMES CAPT. LAD. 31 AUG. 6, 1969 STEUBEN

         

         

     DANIEL P. GAINEY FF. LAD. 31 AUG. 19, 1971 LA GUARDIA

         

     CHARLES P. MC CARTHY FF. LAD. 31 AUG. 29, 1971 FDR

         

     RICHARD J. RITTMEYER FF. LAD. 31 JAN. 20, 1972 WILLIAMS

         

     VINCENT J. BOLLON FF. LAD. 31 JAN. 6, 1972 CRIMMINS

         

     MELFORD J. HAZEL FF. LAD. 31 AUG. 23, 1973 HUGH BONNER

         

     THOMAS J. NEARY FF. LAD. 31 APR. 4, 1974 JAMES GORDON BENNETT

         
 
     - account from NYCFirenet member ******:

          "The James Gordon Bennet Medal, the FDNY's Medal of Honor. One more time. I had the privilege of witnessing a member perform a rescue that was awarded to him the Bennet medal.

          Warm night. Around 1900 hours the 6th Division chief, DC Curley, came into our qtrs. (82,31,B27), with the chief was a photographer from Life Magazine. The photographer had permission from downtown to take photo's of 82/31 apparatus, qtrs. and members for a human interest spread in the magazine generated by Smith's book "Report From Engine 82, which was on the best seller list at the time. As we lined up for a roll-call a box came in, both companies were first due. We responded and Chief Curley followed us in the division car. E94 and L48 were returning from another box in the area when they saw a column of smoke from this fire. Normally 2nd due they both arrived first. As I arrived I saw the fire was on the top floor of a 5 story occupied tenement. There was a front fire escape. On the top floor exposure 2 side a woman was hanging out the 2nd window over from the fire escape window. The woman was holding a small child out in front of her. Smoke was showing from all 3 windows with some fire now beginning to show from the fire escape window. 94 was stretching. 48 was raising their rearmount. The ladder was malfunctioning, it would elevate and extend but was jamming on rotation, rotating only a few inches at each try, the tip still 8 to 10 feet from the window. There was several hundred people in the street half yelling for her to hold on the other half to throw the child down to several men under her in the street. There was an outside cellar entrance (OLT) under this line of apartments with a iron picket fence. If she and the child went out the window they most likely would have been impaled by the fence. We carried a life net on 82, I told my guys to get the net. 31 arrived and FF Tom Neary went up the buildings steps into the fire building followed by his officer Lt. Don Butler. The remaining 31 members went for their roof rope. The fire escape window was now fully involved in fire with fire now showing at the top of the 1st window over, in the same room as the woman and child. This whole incident took about as long as it takes to read this. The woman raised the child to throw her as fire was now over her head. Then a firefighter was seen by her side, FF Neary, a second later by Lt. Butler. Butler took the child and dove out the window to the now 4 foot or so 48 ladder tip, caught and held by a 48 member. Neary then threw the woman out the window onto the ladder a few seconds later. Neary then dove out the window head first his turnout smoldering his pants on fire, no bunker gear then. Neither Butler or Neary had a mask. All 4 went to the hospital. Neary was out for several months from the leg burns. I went over to the Life photographer and asked him if he had gotten any shots of the rescue. He said no as he was so taken by what he was seeing he forgot to take any pictures, a shame as that would have made some "human interest" spread in the magazine. Both Butler and Neary were awarded a Class 1 medal (rescue made under extreme personal danger, highest medal class by the FDNY). That year Neary was awarded the Bennett medal.

          A few years later Neary was promoted to Lt. and assigned to 28 truck in Harlem. Another fire and another child trapped in a rear tenement room with a fully involved room trapping her. Neary took a door off an adjoining apartment door. He used the door as a shield sliding under it to the child's room, grabbed the child and slid back, again no bunker gear or mask. Again he was out for several moths with burns to the hand even received even with his gloves on from holding the door over him. Neary received a second Class 1 medal that year and a second Bennet medal.

          The War Years, best of times worst of times. The worst the junkies and criminals that burned down so many neighborhoods, the best the men of the FDNY, the Bravest, Neary comes to mind."

     MELVILLE F. FLYNN FF. LAD. 31 JAN. 21, 1974 PRENTICE

         
     
     THOMAS M. KENNEDY FF. LAD. 31 JAN. 21, 1974 DELEHANTY

         

     DONALD H. BUTLER LT. LAD. 31 APR. 4, 1974 BRUMMER

         

     THOMAS M. KENNEDY FF. LAD. 31 APR. 12, 1975 JOHNSTON

         

     ROBERT E. FARRELL CAPT. LAD. 31 APR. 12, 1975 THIRD ALARM

         

     BERNARD P.D. CASSIDY FF. LAD. 31 MAY 19, 1976 KRIDEL

         

     CARMINE A. CROCE FF. LAD. 31 JAN. 11, 1977 KRIDEL

         

         

     THOMAS J. MC BRIDE FF. LAD. 31 JUL. 24, 1978 CONRAN

         

     DANIEL P. GAINEY FF. LAD. 31 APR. 13, 1978 TREVOR-WARREN

         

     CARL W. FLORENCO FF. LAD. 31 FEB. 4, 1981 MC ELLIGOTT

         

     HENRY E. WALTER FF. LAD. 31 JUL. 13, 1988 1988 1989 CONNELL

         

     DAVIS J. GIAMBALVO FF. LAD. 31 OCT. 29, 2007 2008 BROOKMAN

         

         

     LUCAS A. NISKANEN FF. LAD. 31 DEC. 17, 2017 2018 HUGH BONNER

         

         


LODDs:

     FF Michael J. Cunningham Engine 82 May 12, 1927

          FF Cunningham lost his balance and fell to the floor while shining the brass pole in quarters. His skull was fractured, his spine snapped and he suffered four broken ribs. Cunningham was taken to Lincoln Hospital where he died the next morning without regaining consciousness. He had been with the Department since June of 1920, appointed in Engine 53, and transferred to Engine 82 the past November. He was only thirty-four years old.

     LT Geoffrey Guja, Engine 82  September 11, 2001 World Trade Center.

         

         

          https://www.firehero.org/fallen-firefighter/geoffrey-e-guja/

          http://www.legacy.com/sept11/story.aspx?personid=94805

     RIP.  Never forget.


South Bronx:

     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Bronx













« Last Edit: March 15, 2019, 06:42:56 PM by mack »

Offline mack

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #124 on: March 04, 2018, 02:34:21 AM »



























Offline mack

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #125 on: March 04, 2018, 02:37:37 AM »
"When the Bronx Was Burning"  - John Finucane  - Engine 85 - South Bronx

     

Offline mack

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #126 on: March 04, 2018, 02:46:56 AM »
"Why the Bronx Burned" - NY Post  By Joe Flood  May 16, 2010 |

     

It was game two of the 1977 World Series, a chilly, blustery October night in the South Bronx. The Yanks were already down 2-0 in the bottom of the first inning when ABC’s aerial camera panned a few blocks over from Yankee Stadium to give the world its first live glimpse of a real Bronx Cookout. “There it is, ladies and gentlemen,” Howard Cosell intoned. “The Bronx is burning.”

The scene quickly became a defining image of New York in the 1970s, a fitting summation of the decade perfect in every way but one: It never happened. Cosell, tapes of the game show, never said, “The Bronx is burning.”
“It’s a great quote, if it had been a real one,” says Gordon Greisman, who co-wrote and produced ESPN’s “The Bronx is Burning” mini-series based on the Jonathan Mahler book. “But we got all of this footage from Major League Baseball, including the entire broadcast of that game, and we went through all of it and it’s not there, because God knows if it was there we would have used it.”

More likely, the phrase was invented by New Yorkers — what the broadcaster should have said — and spun by credulous journalists. But Cosell’s “Play It Again, Sam” moment is hardly the only myth that has sprung out of one of the darkest chapters of New York City history. The South Bronx (along with Brooklyn’s Brownsville, Bushwick, and Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhoods, and Manhattan’s Harlem and Lower East Side) was indeed burning. Seven different census tracts in The Bronx lost more than 97% of their buildings to fire and abandonment between 1970 and 1980; 44 tracts (out of 289 in the borough) lost more than 50%. “The smell is one thing I remember,” says retired Bronx firefighter Tom Henderson. “That smell of burning — it was always there, through the whole borough almost.”

But many of these fires were not — as was suggested then and is popular opinion now — caused by a rash of arsons. In fact, there’s a good chance that not even the World Series blaze was intentional. That fire was in an abandoned schoolhouse, there was no insurance policy for anyone to cash in on.
Hoodlums did not burn The Bronx. The bureaucrats did.

IN 1971, Mayor John Lindsay asked the FDNY’s chief of department, John O’Hagan, for a few million dollars in savings to help close a budget deficit. O’Hagan turned to a team of statistical whiz kids from the New York City-RAND Institute, a joint endeavor of the mayor’s office and the Santa Monica-based defense think tank famous for all but inventing the fields of game theory, systems analysis and nuclear strategy (and for devising a series of spectacular strategic failures in Vietnam).

NYC-RAND’s goal was nothing less than a new way of administering cities: use the mathematical brilliance of the computer modelers and systems analysts who had revolutionized military strategy to turn Gotham’s corrupt, insular and unresponsive bureaucracy into a streamlined, non-partisan technocracy.

For O’Hagan’s fire department, RAND built computer models that replicated when, where, and how often fires broke out in the city, and then predicted how quickly fire companies could respond to them. By showing which areas received faster and slower responses, RAND determined which companies could be closed with the least impact. In 1972, RAND recommended closing 13 companies, oddly including some of the busiest in the fire-prone South Bronx, and opening seven new ones, including units in suburban neighborhoods of Staten Island and the North Bronx.
RAND’s first mistake was assuming that response time — a mediocre measure of firefighting operations as a whole, but the only aspect that can be easily quantified — was the only factor necessary for determining where companies should be opened and closed. To calculate these theoretical response times, RAND needed to gather real ones. But their sample was so small, unrepresentative and poorly compiled that the data indicated that traffic played no role in how quickly a fire company responded.

The models themselves were also full of mistakes and omissions. One assumed that fire companies were always available to respond to fires from their firehouse — true enough on Staten Island, but a rarity in places like The Bronx, where every company in a neighborhood, sometimes in the entire borough, could be out fighting fires at the same time. Numerous corners were cut, with RAND reports routinely dismissing crucial legwork as “too laborious,” and analysts writing that data discrepancies could “be ignored for many planning purposes.”
Finally, the models fell prey to the very thing that technocracies are supposed to prevent, political manipulation. At the outset the RAND studies didn’t need to be manipulated — they provided what the politicians wanted without prompting. The models’ flaws all tended to make it appear that poor, fire-prone (and generally black and Puerto Rican) neighborhoods were actually over-served by the fire department, and recommended the cuts be focused in these politically weak areas. But as the cuts deepened, the models began recommending closings in wealthier, more politically active communities, an untenable development for the ambitious chief O’Hagan, who was well-connected in the Democratic clubs of Brooklyn and Queens and was later appointed fire commissioner.
“There was no question that where the commissioner kept his car was not a house that was going to be closed,” says RAND’s Rae Archibald, who was later hired as an assistant fire commissioner. “If the models came back saying one thing and [O’Hagan] didn’t like it, he would make you run it again and check, run it again and check.”
When the results still didn’t come back to his liking, O’Hagan’s men handled the problem. “Mostly we used [the RAND models] for the cuts, but if they came back saying to close a house in a certain neighborhood, well . . . if you try to close a firehouse down the block from where a judge lived, you couldn’t get away with it,” says retired chief Elmer Chapman, who ran the department’s Bureau of Planning and Operations Research. In those cases, continues Chapman, you could simply skip down the list of closings to a company in a poorer neighborhood. The models said there were less painful cuts to be made, “ut the people in those [poorer] neighborhoods didn’t have a very big voice.”

As the city’s budget deficit ballooned, the RAND studies were used to close dozens more companies; in all, 50 fire units were shuttered or moved. Fire inspections were cut by 70%; the fire marshal program was gutted; ancient rigs with outmoded safety features and rickety wooden ladders were pressed into service, and fire alarm boxes broke down by the score.

“I’d say a quarter to a third of the hydrants didn’t work,” says Jerry DiRazzo, who fought fires in the Bushwick section of Brooklyn. “You can see the way an area changes when they don’t repair a neighborhood. Every day I drove over the border from Queens to Brooklyn to go to work, and it was like this imaginary line was crossed. Almost like suddenly the sun wasn’t shining, like it was darker somehow . . . People would ask me, ‘How can you deal with this, seeing that every day?’ And I’d tell them, ‘I have a front row seat to the greatest show on earth.’ This was history being made, a city collapsing.”

DESPITE the models’ predictions of minimal impact, response times shot up and the number of fires that nearby companies fought as much as quadrupled. Citizens who lost their neighborhood firehouses protested. But by citing the supposed statistical infallibility of RAND and its computer models, City Hall was able to mollify the constituencies that really mattered. When the firefighters’ union filed a lawsuit to stop the closings, the department trotted out the models and convinced a U.S. District Court judge to threw the case out, and convinced New York Times editorial page to come out in favor of the closings and to credulously cite one RAND analyst who said the cuts would have no serious impact on coverage.

With fire rates already rising thanks to poverty, family dysfunction and an overcrowded, aging housing stock, the closings helped turn the fire problem into a scourge, consuming block after block of once densely populated, viable neighborhoods. Thanks in large part to technological innovations like smoke detectors and fire-retardant building materials — O’Hagan’s own pet projects — the country at large experienced a 40% drop in fire fatalities from the mid 1960s to late 1970s. In the city O’Hagan was charged with protecting, though, fire fatality rates more than doubled.
Despite the conventional wisdom that arson was to blame, it was ordinary fires, caused by things like faulty wiring, errant cigarettes, and space heaters that drove the destruction. During the 1950s, city fire marshals attributed less than 1% of fires to arson. Until 1975, when the final round of fire cuts went into effect, that ratio never rose above 1.1%.

Where arson was a problem, it was largely the consequence of government intervention intended to mitigate the social consequences of the fires, namely no-questions-asked fire insurance for landlords in fire prone neighborhoods, and special welfare payments made to fire victims. But even at its peak in the late 1970s, arson made up less than 7% of fires, and occurred primarily in already burned-out, abandoned buildings.

The fire cuts even helped lead to the Son of Sam shootings. In the mid-1970s, fire marshal Mike DiMarco was staking out David Berkowitz’s Bronx home after his yellow Ford Galaxy was spotted fleeing the scene of two trash fires set on City Island in the Bronx. “We had him under surveillance for months, watching his car late at night when we didn’t have any fires to run off to,” says DiMarco. But when Berkowitz moved to Brooklyn, the cut-to-the-bone fire marshal division dropped the tail, Berkowitz forgotten until he was arrested for the Son of Sam murders.

AS New York City faces its worst budget shortfall since it almost went bankrupt in 1975, some shadows of the RAND fire closings loom. The mayor’s initial budget plan calls for closing 20 fire companies by July 1, with more closings likely to come if other savings aren’t realized. The fire units up for closing will be announced this week.
Once again, the fire department is making cuts with computer models based on data of questionable validity, releasing incomplete and misleading statistics when it suits the department’s purposes, and refusing to release raw data so that their claims can be verified by anyone outside the department.

But FDNY spokesperson Frank Gribbon says this time will be different. “The chiefs are looking at other factors as well,” as the models, he says. “”There’s a whole host of criteria, and then it’s the expertise of the chief officers who have to consider all of the facts and all of the data.”” Gribbon says the department doesn’t share the data behind the models, nor will it discuss the specifics of how the models work. “The public doesn’t understand,” Gribbon continued. “In terms of what the criteria [for closings] are, we’re not going to convince anybody by discussing, you know, the facts. We’re not going to convince anybody.”

Fire Commissioner Sal Cassano finds himself is in a difficult spot. On the one hand is an understaffed fire department going on as many calls as it ever has (building fires are down 50% from the 1970s, but the department now responds to more 200,000 medical emergencies every year). On the other hand is the man who Cassano, who was the chief of department before being promoted last year, owes his last two jobs to, a mayor intent on closing a looming budget gap.

Like the 1970s, firehouses are being closed while futuristic technology projects, outside consultants and computer models are still being funded. Last year the department paid computer consultants from Hewlett-Packard $3.5 million, about as much as it costs to keep two firehouses open and fully staffed for a year, to continue fine-tuning the Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) system they’d already installed. AVL is part of a new dispatch modeling system built by Deccan International (the same company that built the computer models being used to close fire companies), which in turn is part of a $2 billion overhaul of the city’s emergency dispatch system.

That the department needs to maintain a modern communication and dispatch system is clear, but the usefulness of spending millions to update street-corner fire alarm boxes that the department is planning on shutting down anyway, and equipping 911 operators with special software programs to receive live video feeds from callers, is questionable when basic city services are being slashed.

In a move strangely reminiscent of Rudy Giuliani’s ill fated decision to put all of his Office of Emergency Management eggs in a 7 World Trade Center-housed basket, the department is spending more than $300 million consolidate each borough’s fire dispatch office into one unit at the department’s Metrotech headquarters, and hundreds of millions more to build backup dispatch unit in The Bronx in case the Metrotech unit breaks down or is attacked.

The city has spent more than $20 million on a new Unified Call Taker (UCT) system that lets 911 call takers write down fire information and send it directly to fire dispatchers, instead of simply passing the caller along to more experienced fire call takers. Firefighters have taken to calling UCT the “U Can’t Tell” system after being sent to a series of incorrect addresses by the 911 call takers. And fire call takers are now playing a larger role in the call taking process — eliminating much of the reason for building the UCT system in the first place — after 911 call takers sent fire crews to the wrong addresses for fires in Brooklyn and Queens last November, and three people died in each fire.
A month after the fatal fires, Deputy Mayor Skyler praised UCT in testimony before the city council, saying that it “lowers response times in an effort to save lives.” But according to fire union critics, those lower response times are only true on paper, not in reality. Unlike most fire departments, the FDNY does not count the time a caller spends on the phone with a 911 operator in its response time calculations. And now that 911 operators are taking down fire information, that time is more than a minute, according the Uniformed Firefighters Association. This means that while the FDNY is reporting faster response times, the amount of time it actually takes fire crews to arrive might actually be longer.

THERE is little in New York’s current criminal, economic or building fire trends to indicate that the city will be returning to the ashen anarchy of the 1970s any time soon, but some of the management lessons to be learned from that era are clear: Whiz Kid consultants with plans to save the city through technology have their place, but shouldn’t come at the cost of basic services. And while numbers can sometimes cut through the fog of government decision-making, they can just as easily be mistaken or manipulated.
 
“The models might be able to help you a little bit with closing fire companies,” says former fire commissioner Thomas von Essen, who led the department through the terrorist attacks of 9/11. “But there are so many other parts to those decisions, not just response time but the effectiveness of the unit, the political response from the neighborhood, what kind of buildings are nearby, whether there are schools or hospitals or terrorist targets.
“There’s no question that there are neighborhoods where if the firehouse is removed, it will have a minor impact. But there are also many communities that need additional fire units. It should be an ongoing process, not just something to scare the public in a fiscal crisis.”

Joe Flood is the author of “The Fires: How a Computer Formula, Big Ideas, and the Best of Intentions Burned Down New York City — and Determined the Future of Cities” (Riverhead), in stores on May 27.

     https://nypost.com/2010/05/16/why-the-bronx-burned/
« Last Edit: March 04, 2018, 02:50:40 AM by mack »

Offline mack

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #127 on: March 04, 2018, 02:53:16 AM »
Howard Cosell's "The Bronx is Burning" Comments During 1977 World Series:

     

Offline johnd248

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #128 on: March 04, 2018, 03:58:54 PM »
Casa Grande AKA Casa Willy D due to the amount of time he spent there.

Offline grumpy grizzly

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #129 on: March 04, 2018, 04:27:07 PM »
I have the Code 3 house and both sets of apparatus for Engine82/Tower 31. Now I have the rest of the story.
FAC 20 TASS 68-69 SVN. Hue/PhuBai , Boston Spark from 71-79, Chicago 79-15, Bloomington/Normal 2015- present

Offline nfd2004

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #130 on: March 04, 2018, 06:13:48 PM »
Casa Grande AKA Casa Willy D due to the amount of time he spent there.

 John understands. We were both volunteer firefighters together then. He had his stories of Brooklyn and I had my stories of the Bronx.

 I was already "hooked" into it when the book Report from Engine Co 82 came out in 1972 (?). A few years earlier was my introduction into the FDNY at Engine Co 210 and Rescue 2. Then Harlem companies too. (see; "My Younger Buffing Years" in the History Section)

 For so many of us, we still talk about it to this day. All those stories, the pictures, the videos that mack posted about 82/31, and the guys that were a part of it, forever changed the lives of so many of us.

Offline mack

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #131 on: March 04, 2018, 06:49:18 PM »
Former captain of Engine 82 during War Years - NYCFirenet member ****** Chief Bob Manson w/DAC John O'Hagen:

     

     Picture posted by "MikeintheBronx"  (http://www.fdnysbravest.com/)


Chief Manson post:

  "The first FDNY firehouse I walked into for a tour was 19 truck on March 30th,1960. Crazy but at that time myself and another 100 proby's did not have one minute of training. The training school on Welfare Island was in session with the previous class and we had to wait until they finished to begin our training. My Lt. told myself and my partner proby (2 were assigned to a 6th Div. house) to get gear off the rack, each carry a can and stay with him. He said that if reached out and could not touch us we were in trouble.19 had a spare wooden aerial for the tour. During the tour a kid walked into qtrs. and said a "cat was in a tree down the street". The Lt. said come on we will take the spare out and test it. We did and that was the only time in my 37 years that I took a cat out of a tree.  Caught a few jobs in the 6 weeks there before school, nothing major. After school I was assigned to 74 engine in Manhattan for 4 years then transferred to 127 truck in Queens for 5 years. My first year in 74 we were 9th in workers with about 1200 runs and 700 or so workers. Hard to say when the war years actually began. I remember hearing that 26 truck did 350 runs one month around 1963 and I couldn't believe that a company could do that much running. A guess would be that the war started around 63 or 64, peaked probably around 76, burned itself out.

I was promoted to Lt. 8/69 out of 127. While 127 was fairly busy for Queens (South Jamaica section) there was no comparison for the busy companies in the actual war zones, S. Bx, Brownsville, Harlem etc. We would hear stories about 120 truck, 31 truck, 82 etc. But hearing and being there is/was a whole different ball game. On promotion 8/69 I was assigned to the 19th Battalion covering. Worked in what would become busy companies years later, 33 truck, 75 engine etc, but they were not busy at that time. Being in the Bx though every tour the circuits would be open due to jobs and all the boxes being transmitted would be heard throughout the boro, never stopped. One day tour I was assigned for the tour in 50 engine. I have to say though it was not an exceptional busy tour maybe 10 runs no real work I fell in love with the guys and the house, just the way they handled themselves. At this time there were only 2 Lts. assigned to 50 with no Captain. They were waiting for Charlie Rivera (later Fire Commissioner) to be promoted out of 76 engine to be given 50. I put in for the company and was assigned 1/7/70. I worked there until 4/73 when I made Captain. I have to say that these were the best years of my time in the FDNY. Just to rub shoulders with those men was an honor and a privilege. Some fires I remember well others not at all. A few. Came in one summer night for a 6x9. Was a busy day in the Bx. 50 was in qtrs. 19 was not. A 2nd alarm was going over by 82. At the first minutes of the tour we were sent to a box a few blocks from the 2nd by ourselves. On arrival we found a rubbish fire going good in an ally  between 3 story row frames. We dropped 2 lines one to knock down the rubbish and the other into the exp. 4 side occupied frame that had fire on all 3 floors. We knocked the fire down couple of rooms on the1st and 2nd floors but when we got up to the 3rd we were short hose. Fire was in 2 rooms and the cockloft. I sent one of the guys down for a roll-up. As we were waiting a BC came up and ordered us out of the building. We left the line and came down into the street. We went across the street and sat on a stoop. No masks our eyes were bothering us beside other things. A 3rd had been transmitted for the box. A BC was coming down the street and when he saw us he asked "if we wanted to go to the hospital and have our eyes washed out?" I said sure so 5 of us went in the BC car to the hospital (Bx Leb). I found out later that when the chief returned to the car the aide told him that they were at the wrong 3rd they should have been at the 82 3rd. So they responded to the other 3rd. As we are at the hospital the frame we were in collapses. All that can be seen is the collapse on top of our line going into the frame. An Assistant Chief comes in and does a roll call. No 50. He is about to transmit a 4th with additional rescues, chaplains etc. for a company in a collapse when a ff from 19 tells him that "50 got in a chief's car and left." I'm at the hospital and a nurse asks me my name. I tell her and she says "you have a phone call." It is the Bx dispatcher and he says by order of A.C. Snyder I was to immediately return to the scene, a car was being sent for me. I think he wants to give me a well done for all the fire we knocked down, didn't know about the collapse. But it was not so. As he was chewing me out I told him that the BC had put it over the radio that he was removing ff's to the hospital, he hadn't. This stopped the A.C. and that was it. We were all granted "remainder of tour off" by the medical officer. Was a great tour, had a good fire and was back home by 2100 hours.

Another 6x9 around 0600 hours we go in 3rd due to a box. Fire is in an occupied 5 story tenement. Arson. Someone had thrown gasoline throughout a 1st floor apartment and on the stairs 5th floor down. The 1st engine 71 takes their line into the 1st floor apartment. 50-2 is ordered to stretch into the exposure to prevent extension. We are ordered to knock down the stairs. The apartments have dumbwaiters in the kitchens. Two apartments per floor. We knock down the stairs 1st to 2nd, 2nd to 3rd and 3rd to 4th and hit the kitchens where the fire in the dumbwaiter has spread to them. As we are making the hall on the 4th floor we find a badly burned dead body. It takes us a few seconds to "get around him." As we make the turn the stairs from the 5th floor to the roof collapses. We can't get by as the stairs are completely blocked with a ton or more of debris, close call. The body was a father who went back up the stairs to try and save his family, but they were already out. I always have thought that he saved us, another second or two and we would have been on the stairs.

I was promoted to Captain 4/73. During my years in 50 my wife would be after me to transfer to a slower house so that I wasn't always so tired after tours. I would put her off by saying that when I made Captain I would be assigned to a slow Division as department policy. On promotion I was assigned to the 15th Division, the second busiest division in the FDNY at the time. My first tour was in103 truck and we had 27 runs. I came home tired and my wife just said "you don't look any different." There was 6 of us promoted to Captain. One of the news guys was mad out of the 16th Division, probably the slowest Division in the job, east end of Queens. He stays in the 16th covering. I call up the transfer Lt. and ask him if I have ghetto next to my name. He says why and I say I go from the 6th to the 15th and another new Captain stays in the 16th? Like him I want to see my grandchildren grow up. He says O.K. send me your paper. I do and a few weeks later am transferred to the 13th Division in Queens. Am there a week when the Division Commander of the 6th, DC Kelsey, calls me and says that Captain Grey (Albergrey in Smith's book) is being promoted and do I want 82. I say sure and send in my paper. The Lt. in the transfer unit calls me and tells me I am a wise ass.

Assigned to 82 9/1/73. 50 was very busy, 82 even more so. 50 would run heavy until 0200 or 0300, 82 would never stop, go all night. But like 50/19 the guys in 82/31 were great. As above in 1960 74 did 1200 runs 700 workers, 9th busiest engine that year out of 212 engines. July of 1975 82 (the number) did 210 structural fires with 205 structural hours for the one month. And this was as 82 was slowing down. Busy box of course was 2743, Charlotte and 170. Good times and some not so. We had the strike 11/73, with ordered lifts, the lay-offs, some tough times.

There were thousands of FDNY guys doing heavy work during those years. I'll be 78 next August don't know how much longer I'll be here so I hope other brothers add to this thread as to their experiences during this FDNY period. Best of times, working with the greatest firefighters in the world and the worst of times seeing so many people lose their lives and homes, why was it allowed? "

     - thank you Chief
« Last Edit: February 26, 2019, 12:00:48 AM by mack »

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #132 on: March 04, 2018, 07:13:00 PM »
Engine 82/Ladder 31 War Years - continued - per Chief Bob Manson:

     1960 Ward LaFrance - Firebrand                 Reg #5928
     1968 Mack CF with Jump Seat Enclosures    Reg #1072
     1971 Mack CF 4 Door Cab                          MP7111
     1975 Mack CF 4 Door Cab                          MP7505
     1978 Mack CF 4 Door Cab                          MP7838

Engine 82 Interchange:

     During the War Years - FDNY created a "INTERCHANGE PROGRAM" that rotated busy units to slower areas of the city. Here was 82's Schedule:

          Monday - 6x9 (Night Shift 6pm - 9am) Interchange with Engine 295 in Queens
          Tuesday - Squad 2 (shared Quarters with Engine 73) would run FIRST DUE from 82's from 1900 - 0100
          Wednesday - 6x9 (Night Shift 6pm - 9am) Interchange with Engine 297 in Queens
          Thursday - Squad 2 would run FIRST DUE from 82's from 1900 - 0100
          Friday, Saturday & Sunday - it was not uncommon to see as many as FIVE other Engines at the house called "ACTING ENGINE 82"


Fires:

     July 1975 - Engine 82 responded to 210 Structural Fires IN ONE MONTH - They had somewhere near 1700-1800 Building Fires A YEAR!!!


Staffing:

     Trucks - 7 FFs; Engines - 6 FFs


Apparatus that shared "LA CASA GRANDE" from 1960 to 1980 during the War Years:

     Ladder 31

          1962 ALF 900 Series Open Cab Tiller      Reg #460
          1969 ALF 900 Series Tiller                     AL6905
          1973 Mack CF Tower Ladder                  MT7313
          1980 Mack CF Tower Ladder                  MT8010

     Engine 85 (formed by members from Squad 9)

          7/1/67 - 7/8/71 @ Engine 82
          7/9/71 - Disbanded 1882 - @ Boston Rd

          1968 Mack CF                                     
          1971 Mack CF                                     MP7131
          1975 Mack CF                                     MP7515
          1981 Mack CF LIME Yellow                     MP8106


     TCU-712

          11/15/69-7/8/71 @ Engine 82 Operations (Stored at Engine 43)
          7/9/71-11/24/72 @ Engine 85 - Disbanded to form Ladder 59 with Engine 43
         

          1961 Mack C/Grove                             Reg #456
          1970 Seagrave Rearmount                    SL7015


     Searchlight 3

          5/17/51 - 6/24/67 relocated to Engine 96
          1954 International/Diehl

     Battalion 27

          7/26/69 -6/1/78 relocated to Engine 79


The way rigs were parked in the station... IF they bothered to even go back inside:

     Ladder 31 a Tiller was on the side marked Ladder 31.
     Bn 27 was in the middle usally outside during day light hours.
     Engine 82 and 85 would park in the side marked Engine 82 side by side
     TCU 712 would be in front of these. IF During the time TCU was in quarters otherwise they might be "stacked" one in front of the other.
     This is why most TCU Ladders & 2nd Section Ladders were Rearmounts. They had to stack rigs and a 2nd Tiller would NOT fit.
« Last Edit: March 04, 2018, 07:21:26 PM by mack »

Offline mack

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #133 on: March 04, 2018, 09:23:03 PM »
CAPT Robert E. Farrell - James Gordon Bennett Medal

Firefighter - Ladder 4 - Manhattan Box 878 - February 27, 1965 - 0330 hrs:
 
     

     "Fireman 1st Grade Robert E. Farrell awarded James Gordon Bennett Medal.  On February 27, 1965 Ladder Company 4 was assigned to Box-878 for a fire at 989 Second Avenue in Manhattan.  The building was a 5-story non-fireproof dwelling, class-A.  Upon arrival, Ladder 4 was assigned to assist in the search and evacuation of civilians from the fire building.  The interior stairs were already compromised by the fire, so the crew from Ladder 4 utilized the stairs of one the exposures to access the roof of the fire building, however, before they could get there the roof had collapsed.  The crew of Ladder 4 checked the rear of the fire building to find heavy fire conditions coming from the windows of floors 3, 4 and 5.  These conditions eliminated the option for using the rear fire escape.
 
     During this time, Firefighter Farrell heard a call for help.  He discovered a trapped civilian at a fourth floor window, to the left of the fire escape.  The crew decided to initiate a rescue using their roof rope.  This decision had its share of risks and dangers, being that the rescuer would have to be lowered through and work as heat, smoke and flames continued emitting from the windows.  The plan was to lower the rescuer, swing him to the window where the victim was located and then swing him back to his right in order to reach a fire escape on the adjoining building.
 
     Firefighter Farrell was lowered into position just opposite to where the victim was.  He worked himself to the window where the victim was located.  He grabbed the trapped woman, and as he then tried to swing back to the fire escape as planned, he discovered that the woman had become entangled in the venetian blind cords and window drapes.  In order to free the woman, Firefighter Farrell was forced to hold her with one arm while dangling on the rope, and clear the entanglement with his other hand.   
 
     At enormous risk and with great difficulty, having been suspended pendulum fashion and with having had only one leg to maintain his position at the window, the woman was finally freed.  Bob then swung away from the window to the fire escape of the adjoining building where he was grabbed by another firefighter.  At that moment, then window where the woman had been trapped erupted into flames.
 
     “This woman is alive today due to Fireman Farrell’s efforts."  With complete disregard for his own safety, he rapidly and competently performed his duty in the highest traditions of this department”.

     - June 6, 1965 printed copy of the FDNY Medal Day Book.   
 


CAPT Bob Farrell - Ladder 31:

     


Lt Farrell's/Captain Farrell's Ladder 31 helmet:

     

     

     
« Last Edit: March 04, 2018, 09:37:27 PM by mack »

Offline scoobyd

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Re: FDNY and NYC Firehouses and Fire Companies - 2nd Section
« Reply #134 on: March 05, 2018, 07:35:37 PM »
Also very noteworthy about Capt. Farrell-  he went on to be founder and CEO of www.firehooksunlimited.net