RIT/FAST HISTORY

mack

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Do We Really Do RIT Justice?​

5.23.2013
By Stuart Grant and Bret Stidham

I know as you read the title of this article you thought, “Yeah, yeah, here is another guy harping on rapid intervention.” But look inside your organization and ask yourself: does your agency really do rapid intervention justice? Many fire departments across the nation say they provide rapid intervention, but is it just lip service or do you really dedicate a company to providing this service? Many times if we meet two-in/two-out, we say we have rapid intervention taken care of. Other times, departments look around and, if they see two people outside of the fire, they consider rapid intervention taken care of; they just assume that if something goes wrong or someone issues a Mayday, they can grab those people. This cannot further from the truth. They are relying on luck, and luck can get people injured or killed!

A BRIEF HISTORY OF RIT
Rapid intervention or firefighter rescue is not something new. We can trace some of the earliest attempts at organizing firefighter rescue back to 1915 in New York City. On March 8, 1915, FDNY’s Rescue 1 went into service as a resource for assisting trapped firefighters. Rescue 1 was equipped with the specialized equipment of the day. Things rocked along until the late 1960s and early 1970s when the London Fire Brigade designated “Emergency Teams” equipped with emergency air supply equipment and air transfer lines. These were the early attempts at what we now know as rapid intervention team (RIT) packs. In 1980, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration enacted 29CFR 1910, which provided for the “buddy system” in IDLH atmospheres. Later, in the same standard, 29CFR1910.134.G.4 became known as the two-in/two-out rule. This required that four people had to assemble prior to entry–two would remain outside to provide immediate assistance to the two inside, if needed. In 1986, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) published NFPA Standard 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, which is a consensus standard to provide a health and safety standard for fire departments andstates that “there should be personnel prepared to initiate rescue operations.” In 2001, the NFPA published NFPA Standard 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire Department, which recommended that the initial arriving company should have the capability to implement the initial RIT (IRIT) and that the IRIT should be replaced by a full RIT. That same year, the 77th Legislature for the State of Texas passed Senate Bill 382, which made two-in/two-out the law in the state of Texas.

While all of these standards and recommendations were being written, tragedies were happening across the country. On July 25, 1987, John Nance was killed in the line of duty when he became trapped in a basement in Columbus, Ohio. Acting Lieutenant Nance had fallen through a collapse in the floor; several rescue operations were undertaken but he succumbed to his injuries before he could be removed. On September 28, 1992, Denver (CO) Firefighter Mark Langvardt was killed during a commercial building fire. He was trapped in a small storage room on the second floor and was unable to self-extricate from the building. Over the course of an hour, there were more than a dozen unsuccessful attempts to remove Firefighter Langvardt from the building. These two incidents were paramount in increasing the attitude of firefighter safety and lead to several programs to educate the fire service on saving ourselves. It also stimulated the fire service to thinking about rescuing our own. But then on March 14, 2001, the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department lost Firefighter Bret Tarver during a fire in a supermarket. After many rescue attempts, Firefighter Tarver was removed from the building but succumbed to his injuries. Phoenix did an outstanding job researching RIT and RIT operations and became a leader in firefighter safety. But did the rest of us listen?

Those were fires in large commercial buildings that required the response of multiple alarms and firefighters. What about RIT in smaller departments and at smaller incidents? Two tragic loss-of-life fires that happened prior to 2001 were in Lake Worth and in Houston, Texas. Both of these incidents occurred in smaller commercial buildings and happened during the initial attack phase of the operation. In both incidents, a dedicated RIT was not in place. We must constantly ask ourselves, how do we protect our firefighters during single-alarm responses or multiple-alarm responses? Don’t we owe it to them and their families?

According to multiple articles in national fire service publications and multiple after action reports (AAR), the resounding truth about RIT is that if teams are not in place or cannot perform in a safe and timely manner, firefighters may die or be seriously injured. Not only could the original firefighter be killed or injured, but poorly trained and/or equipped personnel sent in to rescue them may perish as well.

THE DALLAS SOLUTION
Dallas (TX) Fire-Rescue’s (DFR) engine companies and truck companies ride with four members. This allows for the two-in/two-out requirement to be met with the initial company arriving on scene. Also dispatched on the first-alarm assignment is a second truck company that responds as a dedicated RIT company. For many years, this was the plan and our answer to fulfilling the RIT commitment to our members. Many times the companies that were assigned RIT duties have viewed this as though they were being slighted by not being assigned a firefighting activity; alternately, some saw this as a front-row seat to simply watch the action.

Although all firefighters have basic training in RIT operations, Dallas Fire-Rescue decided to elevate our commitment to firefighter safety. A proposal was made to involve DFR’s Special Operations Division in the RIT role. This would be accomplished by offering advanced-level training to its Special Operations Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team members as a dedicated RIT. An assessment was conducted to validate the desire to offer specialized training to members of the special operations group in anticipation of future operations involving downed or injured firefighters. Deputy Chief Stuart Grant and Captain Bret Stidham from the department’s special operations teams observed internal responses, studied multiple AARs, and spoke to other agencies that had lost members in the line of duty to determine what the best course of action for DFR would be. Since DFR already has a highly trained Type 3 USAR team on staff and ready to respond at all times, it was determined that the best route would be to better make use of their training and expertise. This would also give the department another return on its investment in the USAR program. The next step would be to conduct RIT training with this particular group and provide them with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform this role. Dispatch protocols were developed that the department would continue with the second truck as RIT on the first alarm and they would be replaced with a 10-person RIT from the USAR team on the second alarm.

Since the RIT may have to perform very technical rescues, these unique challenges could not be remedied by a simple classroom course. The training needed to be technical in nature and involve a lot of hands-on opportunities and practical exercises to evaluate the participants’ knowledge, skills, and abilities. Not only was this a recommendation of Grant and Stidham, but it was also a strong recommendation from participants in a pilot course held in Colorado during 2011.

The results of the pilot course were used to strengthen the training program and ensure the needs of the participants and the department were met. Areas of improvement that were identified during the pilot course included the need to include additional practical exercises, hands-on opportunities, and more “tricks of the trade” to help the participants understand what works and what does not work in real-world situations. The participants enjoyed the classroom portion of the training but they wanted the opportunity to apply what they learned in the classroom with simulated scenarios involving RIT activation.

To satisfy their request, help was solicited from Lanita Magee, the emergency management coordinator for the Dallas Department of Aviation, to help create a 24-hour training program. The program was designed to include the classroom portion and four practical exercises of increasing complexity. These exercises have allowed the participants to exercise and evaluate their own performance while providing them with an opportunity to enhance their knowledge, skills, and abilities.

The classroom portion introduces the students to the concept of rapid intervention, the history of rapid intervention, tools and equipment, self-preservation (including self-rescue, drags, communications), and how to set a RIT team up for maximum effectiveness. The first of the exercises concentrates on self awareness, evaluation and skills to help remove themselves and a firefighter from a Mayday situation. The scenario is arraigned so that a firefighter issues a Mayday and the RIT has to locate the firefighter, assess them, place on RIT air and remove them from the location. The second scenario builds upon the first by increasing the distance the firefighter is in the building, therefore requiring the RIT to “hand off” the down firefighter several times. The third scenario incorporates several obstacles to reach the firefighter and also includes entanglement devices that the RIT must overcome to remove the down firefighter. The team must perform a forcible exit to remove the firefighter and themselves from the structure. The fourth exercise continues to build complexity and the RIT must extricate the down firefighter out of the structure the same way they entered the structure. This scenario incorporates an elevation change inside the structure. Recently, a fifth scenario was developed that can be used in place of one of the original scenarios or added to the program if time permits. This scenario replicates an actual incident in Dallas that claimed the life of one of our firefighters.

Lieutenant Todd Krodle lost his life on August 14, 2011, when he fell through the roof of an apartment complex and became trapped in the trusses of the attic. This provided several challenges to locate, reach, and extricate him. Incorporating these different scenarios lets us design the hands on portion to fit the needs of the department and to fit different time constraints that may be placed on them. With this training program in place, the special operations division was able to meet the requirements of NFPA Standard 1407, Standard for Training Fire Service Rapid Intervention Crews.

The best thing that we can do in memory of our fallen brothers and sisters is teach others from their incidents. Rapid intervention is an important aspect of the firefighting profession. If we are going to send the most valuable resource our departments have (our people) into a burning structure, don’t we owe it to them and their families to have the resources to go and get them if something goes wrong? If we cannot provide proper rapid intervention with enough people to actually perform rapid intervention, then maybe we don’t go in!

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(1) All RIT equipment is laid out on the RIT tarp. Equipment is selected depending on the type of structure involved. Check sheets have been incorporated to ensure nothing is overlooked.
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(2) The first RIT team responds to the Mayday from their staging area. The initial deployment is two members tosearch, find, and locate. Two additional members are ready to bring needed equipment or manpower. Three additional two person teams are ready also for a total of a ten person RIT team.
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(3) The Mayday firefighter is trapped in an attic space. This is all that can be seen of him, his foot through the sheetrock.
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(4) Members work to locate the firefighter in the attic.
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(5) Once the firefighter is located, then a large area in the ceiling is opened to be able to access the firefighter and remove them.
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(6) The RIT pack with a fifty foot section of air hose proved to be a valuable asset to assisting the member in the attic. The RIT pack is left on the floor and the face piece attached to the air line is taken to them in the attic.


STUART GRANT, CFO, MIFireE, a 34-year veteran of the fire service, is a deputy chief with Dallas (TX) Fire Rescue in the special operations division. Stuart is certified as a master firefighter and fire instructor with the Texas Commission on Fire Protection. Stuart has served in many capacities within the Department including academy commander, hazmat officer, paramedic, and rope rescue member. He is a task force Leader for the Dallas regional USAR team and the state’s second USAR team (TX-TF2). He also has been a HOT instructor and speaker at FDIC and FDIC West, and instructs at Collin College in McKinney, Texas, and at the Texas A&M University Municipal Fire School. He has two associates’ degrees and a bachelor’s degree in fire administration. He has also been recognized by the Center of Public Service Excellence as a “Chief Fire Officer” and by the Institution of Fire Engineers as a “Member.”

BRET STIDHAM is a 19-year veteran of the Dallas (TX) Fire-Rescue Department. He is a captain assigned to Truck 19 in east Dallas. Bret is certified as a master firefighter and Level III fire instructor with the Texas Commission on Fire Protection. Bret has served in several capacities within the department including a hazmat officer, an USAR officer and instructor at the department’s training academy. He is a rescue manager with Dallas’ USAR team (TX-TF2) and a rescue specialist with TX-TF1. Bret has taught at Collin College in McKinney, Texas, Tarrant County Community College in Ft. Worth, Texas, and at various locations around the country. He also has an associate’s degree in fire administration.

 
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mack

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First-Due Battalion Chief: The Rapid Intervention Team​

By
Danny Sheridan
7.23.2019

By Daniel P. Sheridan
When I entered the fire service in 1986, rapid intervention teams (RITs) did not exist. In the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), the RIT was known as the FAST (Firefighter Assist and Search Team) Truck. If there was an emergency where a firefighter was in trouble, it was the expected that the firefighters on scene would deal with it. The FDNY has five heavy rescue companies. Normally, the firefighters that were closest to the firefighter who was in trouble would deal with the situation. Sometimes, at the expense of the operation, firefighters would drop everything and head for the Mayday situation.

I remember the first time I encountered such a situation. We were assigned first-due for a reported working fire in a five-story tenement building. An officer was working that night in our truck company. We were delayed getting out of quarters and wound up second due. That night, the other truck company had two new firefighters on the inside team [consisting of an officer and two firefighters, a forcible entry (“Irons”) firefighter, and an extinguisher (“Can”) firefighter] with a very experienced officer. The firefighter assigned to the roof (photo 1) was a recent transfer into the company. He had previously been assigned to a truck company in lower Manhattan.

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(1) Photos by author.

The fire building was dangerous—five stories with railroad flats and no rear fire escape (photo 2). By the time we arrived, the fire had complete possession of the third floor and had extended to the fourth. The roof firefighter from the other truck company used the adjoining building on the “Bravo” side to access the bulkhead. His officer was pushing him hard to “get the roof.” The roof firefighter became disorientated on the roof due to the extremely heavy smoke condition. Conditions were sobad that he had to don his self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

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(2)

Somehow, he managed to fall down a narrow shaft (photo 3). Although he was bleeding internally and blood was filling up in his lungs, he was able to get a transmission over the handie-talkie: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, I fell down the shaft.” I was near the windows in the rear searching the floor above when I heard the officer’s Mayday (at that time, interior team firefighters didn’t carry a handie-talkie). No one recognized his name; it was his first night with the company.

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(3)

The fire had burned through the floor in the living room. I thought the engine firefighters that were with us on the floor above had fallen through the hole. On hearing the transmission, firefighters abandoned their assignments and went to rescue the downed firefighter. This firefighter survived because he landed on a huge pile of rubbish and his SCBA pushed against the wall to slow his decent.
Despite the fact that, at my department, firefighters have fallen through roofs, buildings have collapsed, and there were a few flashovers, this incident was just one of about seven to which I responded before my department had the FAST truck. The first time I was ever assigned to the FAST truck was as a lieutenant in late 1990s. I was assigned to a working fire as the third truck. When I reported to the incident command post (ICP), the chief told us to stand fast at the ICP. I had no idea what a FAST Truck was. The one thing I remember is that truck companies did not like being assigned FAST.

This all started when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) mandated that, when a fire progresses past the incipient stage and results in an immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) environment, firefighters shall use the “two-in/two-out” rule, which states the following:

When a fire progresses past the incipient stage, the fire area must be considered an IDLH atmosphere. Every member entering the IDLH atmosphere must be equipped with personal protective equipment and a self-contained breathing apparatus. No member shall enter, leave or operate in an IDLH atmosphere unless the member teams-up with at least one other member and remains within visual or voice contact with that member. Each member of the search team shall know the company identity and assigned position of the other members of the search team. Handie-talkies or other electronic communication devices are not acceptable to replace visual or voice contact. At least one of the members of the team within the IDLH must have a handie-talkie and must be able to contact a handie-talkie-equipped member of the Safety Team outside of the IDLH atmosphere.
At least two members must team up prior to entering an IDLH (Two-In) and there must be at least two other members outside the IDLH (Two-Out), who are designated as a Safety Team. The members of the Safety Team shall be available to assist the interior team(s) if the need arises. If a member leaves a contaminated area, another member using an SCBA must accompany this member to a safe area.1


Once the FAST truck arrives, the incident commander (IC) will dispense with the two-in/two-out rule and the FAST Truck will take over the responsibility for overseeing the safety of members operating. One word of caution: It is tempting to put the FAST truck to work, but ICs should do this only as a last resort. Truck companies assigned as the FAST truck will want to get involved in the operation, but they should avoid doing this. The FAST truck should “dress up” the building by removing window coverings, placing portable ladders, and doing anything else that may make the scene safer as long as it is within sight of the ICP. By no means should the FAST truck get involved with the operation.

The FAST truck should report to and stage near the ICP within verbal contact at a position from which they can be readily deployed (photo 4). A FAST unit member trained in using an electronic fireground accountability system (EFAS) (photo 5) must report to the on-scene battalion vehicle to monitor the EFAS and the FAST radio transmissions. However, the IC may assign the FAST unit to stage at a location other than the ICP based on the type of building units are operating, e.g., a high-rise office building. Units shall operate in accordance with established guidelines on FAST unit staging at different building types. At large-scale, high-rise, or unusual operations, the IC can position additional FAST units at other locations.2
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(4)

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(5)

At one response, we arrived at a parking lot where 17 trucks were fully involved. Surrounding the parking lot on three sides were commercial buildings that had three windows facing the lot. Fire was impinging on all three windows, all of which were failing rapidly. I needed a tower ladder immediately. The engine companies did an amazing job stretching four hoselines in minutes. We had a line in each of the exposures and one in the front. Diesel and propane tanks were exploding. The FAST truck was a tower ladder; I knew it was coming and made room in front of the buildings’ parking lot and ordered an additional tower ladder to the rear.

When the tower ladder arrived, I ordered it to the front with a supply line all set. The officer balked; he was quick to remind me that he represented the FAST truck crew. I told him to just go ahead and set up the bucket because we were on the verge of losing three commercial buildings. He complied and I grabbed the officer from the rescue crew and ordered them to assume the duties of the FAST truck until the special unit’s FAST truck arrived.

We in the FDNY are very fortunate to have an EFAS. The FAST truck will assign one firefighter to monitor the board during the duration of the incident and is not to leave that board for the entirety of the incident. The EFAS works off the handie-talkie radios. When a firefighter transmits a message, the identity of the firefighter populates the EFAS board. The handie-talkie also has an emergency alert button (photo 6) that, when depressed, sends out a five-watt tone to all and highlights the firefighter in red on the EFAS board.

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(6)

Although I have not been in command of a Mayday incident, I have been involved in a few. The latest one involved a firefighter running low on air in a multiple dwelling. There was heavy clutter in the fire apartment. The engine was having difficulty getting to the main body of fire, causing the firefighters working inside to be on air longer than they had expected. Because of the heavy clutter and tight quarters, the interior team had difficulty exiting the apartment.

The forcible entry team exited, but when it made it to the public hallway, the officer realized that one of his firefighters was missing and transmitted the Mayday immediately. Had he waited and tried to take care matters into his own hands, it would have caused a delay. Because the Mayday was called so quickly after determination, the FAST unit was there in a matter of seconds and used the FAST Pak to find and augment the missing firefighter with air. (The Fast Pak is a portable air supply intended as an emergency air source for members when they are low or out of air while operating in an IDLH atmosphere. It is carried by all ladder, rescue, and squad companies.) All crews exited together safely.

Calling the Mayday as soon as possible is critical. Firefighters—myself included—are often reluctant to give the Mayday. As a captain, I was caught in a backdraft/smoke explosion on the top floor of a three-story wood frame building (photo 7). I dove down the stairs and, by the time I regained my composure, I realized that there were two other firefighters still in the building. I don’t know why I hesitated. I got on the handie-talkie and gave an incoherent transmission: “Engine 1 to Command Urgent, firefighters may be trapped.”

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(7)

No sooner did I give that transmission when two other firefighters came flying down the stairs behind me. I have replayed that scenario over and over in my mind hundreds of times and I still can’t figure out why I passed that fire on the second floor (the fire was in the bathroom and there was heavy fire outside the window at top of stairs) and not call for the hoseline right then and there, how the explosion happened, and why I didn’t call the Mayday.

It is easy for everyone on scene to become complacent. We must be vigilant and take every precaution necessary to keep our fellow firefighters out of harm’s way; if they do get in trouble, be ready to help them.

References

  1. FDNY, Procedures Managing Members in Distress, Chapter 1, sections 1-3.
  2. FDNY, Procedures Managing Members in Distress, Chapter 2, sections 3.1, 3.2.

Daniel P. Sheridan is a 33-year veteran of and a battalion chief with the Fire Department of New York assigned to Battalion 3. He is a national instructor II and a member of the FDNY IMT. Sheridan is also a lead instructor with Mutual Aid Training Group.
 

mack

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  • Subject: Rapid Intervention Crews ( F. A. S. T. TRUCK )
    By: Captain John Vigiano (Ret)



    I was asked to send you some info on Rapid Intervention Crews. Here in NYC,
    we refer to them as F. A. S. T. units. (firefighter assist search team).
    Other areas of the New York, the term used is Rapid Intervention Teams. They
    are all the same and have the same purpose; to aide fire units or fire
    personnel in trouble.

    I have recently reitired (May 1998) from the New York City Fire Department. I
    spent the last 36 years doing what I loved....riding a fire truck and going to
    fires.

    A few years ago, the FDNY, went through a tough time. Too many members were
    injured and killed in a short periord of time. The think tank went into
    overdrive and soem pretty smart people came up with ideas to curb this
    problem.

    Being a firefighter, you know, we can not change fate, but we can make
    adjustments to training and education to ensure our people have help when they
    need it. Hence, the F.A.S.T. concept was initiated.

    Here is a copy of my former units policy concerning the F.A.S.T. TRUCK
    (Firefighter Assist and Search Team)

    LADDER COMPANY 176 POLICY


    This unit is an additional ladder company above the ladder companies assigned
    on the second alarm.

    Upon arrival, the FAST truck will report to the Incident Commander at the
    Command Post; advise the IC that "they are the FAST TRUCK", and follow his
    direction.

    As per the AUC 273 addendum #155 and ABC 5-88, all members will be equipped as
    follows:

    SCBA WITH PASS ALARMS
    SEARCH ROPE
    LIFESAVING ROPE / LIFE BELT
    RABBIT TOOL WITH FORCIBLE ENTRY TOOLS
    "NORMAL" TOOL ASSIGNMENT WITH ROOF SAW.

    GENERAL DUTIES:

    Listen to HT (Hand held portable radio) transmissions while responding and
    walking to the CP.
    Look at the fire conditions, and discuss what you see.
    Anticipate where we would go and how we would get there....ladders, fire-
    escapes, breaching a wall....if the situation turns to s_ _ t
    Take note of the units working ; their unit numbers; they may be re-located
    units.
    Check out what apparatus we would place our equipment if call to work as a
    relief unit or if equipment is not necessary for operation.

    ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS - HAVE A REACTION PLAN

    SPECIFIC DUTIES:
    (Note: FDNY we have a minimum of an Officer and 5 members)

    A. INSIDE TEAM: ( Officer / Can / Forcible Entry)

    FIRE ESCAPES:
    Are they overcrowded ?
    Will interior units be using them ?
    Will that be the way to get into the building quickly ?

    PORTABLE LADDERS:
    Are they in place ?
    Are additional ladders necessary ?

    B CHAUFFEUR:

    Go to the Aerial / Tower ladder in front of fire building and check it
    out.
    Get familiar with the controls, and make sure it is ready to be used.
    Stay at the turntable if the assigned chauffeur is not there.
    If assigned chauffeur is there, stay at the pedestal in case the assigned
    chauffeur is called into the building by his officer.

    C. OUTSIDE TEAM (OVM / ROOFMAN)

    Check out the perimeter of the building....
    Take note of any shafts, fences or fire-escapes
    Note any obstacles or problems the unit may encounter.
    Report back to Unit Officer in front of building or at CP
    REMEMBER THIS IS A SIZE UP ONLY.

    ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS - HAVE A REACTION PLAN

    THIS IS A UNIT OPERATION, NOT AN INDIVIDUAL ONE

    I trust this will assist you and your department

  • Captain John Vigiano Ladder 176 (Ret.)


CAPT John Vigiano RIP.
 

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